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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between a market’s development status and
its reaction to a developed market, using the data from the Korean and
the US markets. Furthermore, we examine investment strategies based on
the market reaction. The reaction to the US market is restrictive at the
opening period of the market, but overreaction is observed as the market
grows. Maturation of the market and introduction of an overnight futures
market erase most of the overreaction. A contrarian investment strategy
performs remarkably well during the growth period, but is less robust after
the overnight market opens. Nevertheless, investment opportunities can still
be sought for during global economic crises.
JEL Classification: G11; G14
Keywords: Overreaction; KOSPI200; Overnight futures market; Kelly model;
Value-at-Risk.
1. Introduction
Globalization has connected global markets closely, and there is clear
evidence that suggests information transmission between markets. If global
capital markets are efficient, shocks from one market will be evaluated and
reflected in other markets in a timely manner. A number of studies inves-
tigate return co-movement and volatility spillover among capital markets.
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Eun and Shim (1989) and Bessler and Yang (2003) observe that informa-
tion is mutually transmitted between markets; in particular, the US market
has the strongest influence on other markets. Lin et al. (1994) and Karoly
and Stulz (1996) report that the open-to-close return of the NYSE affects
the close-to-open return of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Wongswan (2006)
shows that macroeconomic information from developed countries, such as
the United States and Japan, is transmitted rapidly to emerging markets,
such as Korea and Thailand.
The capital markets of East Asian countries open after the US market is
closed. Therefore, under efficient market hypothesis, it is expected that the
net effect of the information released in the US market will be completely
reflected in the opening price of the East Asian markets and have no effect
on the intraday return. However, many studies report contrasting results.
Becker et al. (1990) show that the daily return of the US market is pos-
itively correlated to both the overnight return and the intraday return of
the Japanese market the subsequent day. This suggests that the informa-
tion from the US market is not fully reflected in the opening price of the
Japanese market, but rather absorbed slowly during the market opening
hours. Becker et al. (1990), however, admit that a trading strategy based
on their findings is not viable when trading costs are considered. Contrary
to Becker et al. (1990), Fung et al. (2010) find a negative correlation be-
tween US market return and subsequent intraday return of the markets of
East Asian countries, including Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Japan, during the period of January 1996 to December 2003. They also
show that the size of the reversal is proportional to the US market return,
and the reversal weakens when there is a gap between the US market clos-
ing and the Asian market opening due to factors such as holidays. Finally,
they show that the reversal does not occur rapidly at the market opening
but progresses steadily until the market closes. Park and Yi (2011) report
a similar phenomenon: the US market return is positively correlated with
the overnight return and negatively correlated with the intraday return of
the Korean market. They attribute this overreaction-reversal to the con-
trarian trading strategy of individual investors who hold a large portion of
the Korean stock market.
Though it seems evident that there exists inefficiency in the process of
information transmission between markets, it is not clear if it is significant
enough to be exploited to make a profit beyond trading costs. Testing a
trading strategy can yield misleading conclusions if trading costs incurred
during trading are not treated properly. One example is the contradictory
results of Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2011): Gatev et al. (2006)
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argue that an annual return of 11% can be achieved through a pairs trading
strategy in the US market. However, Do and Faff (2011) refute this conclu-
sion by showing that most profit disappears when commission, short selling
costs, and market impact are taken into account. Other interesting studies
on the effects of trading costs can be found in Becker et al. (1990), Ball et
al. (1995), Grundy and Martin (2001), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004), and
Chan et al. (1990).
The Korean market, by opening an overnight futures market in 2009,
is uniquely positioned in that trading of the Korean market index futures
is possible practically 24 hours a day. The opening hours of the overnight
market overlap with the opening hours of the US market except for the last
hour, and most information from the US market is transmitted immediately
to the overnight market. We hypothesize that opening of the overnight fu-
tures market changes the dynamics of the regular market price and mitigates
the overreaction-reversal phenomenon.
The aim of this paper is two folds. The first is to address the relation-
ship between the degree of overreaction and the development status of the
market. We also investigate how the introduction of the overnight futures
market affects the overreaction-reversal of the regular market. Second, we
design a trading strategy that exploits the intraday reversal and test if a sig-
nificant profit can be generated even after direct and indirect trading costs
are subtracted. We use KOSPI200 futures as the investment vehicle.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the Korean stock index
futures market is described with some statistics. In Section 3, we confirm
the overreaction-reversal of the Korean market to the US market using an
extended sample. We also examine the effect of the overnight market in this
section. Section 4 is devoted to developing and testing trading strategies
based on the intraday reversal. Finally, concluding remarks are given in
Section 5.
2. KOSPI200 Futures Market
KOSPI200 is a capitalization-weighted index consisting of the two hun-
dred common stocks with the largest market capitalization listed in the
Korea Exchange. This serves as the underlying asset of the KOSPI200 fu-
tures; its initial value is set to 100 on January 1, 1990. The KOSPI200
futures market is characterized by low transaction costs and high liquidity
compared to the spot market. There is no transaction tax and the brokerage
fee is significantly lower than that of the spot market: the fee for futures
trading ranges from 0.1bp to 0.9bp, while the fee for spot trading is about
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ten times higher. It is also the most liquid futures market and has the largest
trading volume in the world. These features make the futures an attractive
vehicle to implement a trading strategy that invests in the market portfolio.
2.1. Regular Futures Market
The KOSPI200 futures market opened on May 3, 1996 and has grown
very quickly, with a daily trading volume of over 38 billion dollars in 2011.
The multiplier of the futures contract is 500,000 KRW (approximately 500
dollars) and the tick size is 0.05, i.e., 25,000 KRW. The regular market
opens at 9:00 am and closes at 15:05 pm, the pre-opening batch auction
runs from 8:00 am to 9:00 am, and the post-market batch auction runs from
3:05 pm to 3:15 pm. There are four different delivery months: March, June,
September, and December, and the expiry is the second Thursday of each
delivery month. The initial margin is 15.0% of the contract size except for
the period between October 11, 2010 and October 7, 2011, during which
the initial margin is 13.5%. The maintenance margin is two thirds of the
initial margin and the minimum portion of the cash margin is one third of
the margin. The rest can be covered by other securities such as stock. The
maximum number of contracts that can be ordered at once is limited to
1,000, and the maximum daily price change is ±10%.
2.2. Overnight Futures Market
The KOSPI200 overnight futures market opened in September 2009 as a
collaboration with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Since opening,
the trading volume has increased steadily, and now exceeds 10% of the
volume of the regular market. The market opens at 6:00 pm after the
regular market is closed, and closes at 5:00 am the following day, which is
equivalent to 4:00 am to 3:00 pm EST. Therefore, except for the last hour,
the futures market and the US stock market are open simultaneously. Daily
settlement is made after the regular market is closed, at the closing price
of the regular market. The maximum order number is 100 contracts and
the maximum daily price change is ±5%. With the advent of the overnight
futures market, KOSPI200 index futures can practically be traded 24 hours
a day.
Table 1 demonstrates the growth of the KOSPI200 index and its futures
market since the launch of the futures market. In the table, the third column
reports the KOSPI200 index at the end of each year and the forth column is
the average daily trading volume of the stocks in KOSPI200. The average
daily number of contracts and trading volume of the futures markets are
reported in the remainder of the columns. The trading volumes are in US
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dollars (converted using the daily exchange rate). The futures market has
grown very rapidly; the trading volume increased from 0.19 billion dollars
in 1996 to 38.59 billion dollars in 2011, overwhelming the size of the spot
market volume (5.23 billion dollars). The overnight futures market is also
growing fast; in 2012, it was comparable in size to the spot market.
[ TABLE 1 HERE ]
3. Reaction of the Korean Market to the US Market
Fung et al. (2010) and Park and Yi (2011) report that the Korean market,
when it opens, overreacts to shocks from the US market and that mispricing
is corrected during the market opening hours, resulting in a negative corre-
lation between the intraday return and the US market return. We examine
their findings over an extended sample period spanning the entire length
of time since the KOSPI200 futures market opened, and also investigate if
introduction of the overnight futures market causes any structural changes
to the dynamics of the regular market price. As proxies for the market port-
folio, we choose KOSPI200 for the Korean market and S&P500 for the US
market.
The sample consists of data from the opening of the KOSPI200 futures
market to the latest data available, i.e., from May 3, 1996 to September 30,
2012. KOSPI200 spot and futures market data are obtained from the Korea
Exchange, and the S&P500 index is obtained from CRSP. The overnight
call rate, which is later used as the risk free return on the margin account,
is available from the Bank of Korea. If only one of the two markets is
open, the corresponding data is removed from the sample. For example,
the Korean market return on July 5th, the day after Independence Day,
is ignored. Similarly, we remove the Monday return of the Korean market
before December 8, 1998, as until this time, the Korean market was open
on Saturday. During this period, the Friday return of the US market affects
the Saturday return of the Korean market, and the Monday return has no
matching US market return. Fung et al. (2010) coined the term ‘calm-down
period’ to describe the situation when there is a gap between the business
days of two markets. That is, weekends and holidays in both countries are
calm-down periods. We adopt this term in this article.
We divide the whole sample into three sub-periods: from the beginning
of the sample to December 4, 2000, when the Korean government declared
its exit from the Asian crisis (Period 1); to November 16, 2009, the opening
of the overnight futures market (Period 2); and to the end of the sample
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(Period 3). During the first period, the Asian economic crisis prevailed and
Korea was under supervision by the IMF. Opening of the Korean capital
market accelerated in this period, and we therefore call this period “opening
of the capital market”. During the second period, the Korean market grew
rapidly and the portion of international capital increased significantly, once
reaching 40% of the total market capitalization of the KOSPI200 stocks.
We call this period “growth of the capital market”. In the third period, the
trading volume of the regular futures market stabilized, while the trading
volume of the overnight market increased significantly. We call this period
“maturation of the capital market”.
Following Park and Yi (2011), we split the daily return of the S&P500,
Rus, into quintiles with threshold values of -0.75%, -0.20%, +0.20%, and
0.75%, and calculate the close-to-open return, Rco, and the open-to-close
return, Roc, of the KOSPI200 futures the subsequent day. We add the
return of the KOSPI200 overnight futures, Rov, in Period 3.
2 The results
are reported in Table 2. We also report the correlation coefficients between
Rus and Rco, Roc, and Rov in Table 3.
Panel (a) displays results from the whole sample period. We can clearly
observe a positive correlation between the US market return and the overnight
return of the Korean market. However, relationship between the US market
return and the intraday return is not obvious: many of the intraday returns
are insignificant and the sign is inconsistent. Period-by-period analysis re-
sults, as reported in Panel (b), (c), and (d), reveal more interesting facts.
A positive correlation between Rus and Rco is apparent in every sub-period.
However, in Period 1, Rco is significant only in the first and the fifth quin-
tiles and the correlation coefficient between Rus and Rco is 0.348, less than
half of those for Period 2 and 3, which are 0.760 and 0.787, respectively.
There is also a hint of a positive correlation between Rus and Roc in this
period: although the values are not significant, Roc has the same sign as Rus
in most quintiles. This signifies that in the opening period of the capital
market, the Korean market was not fully integrated with the global market
and information transmission from other countries was rather slow.
A significant negative correlation between Rus and Roc, evidence of the
overreaction-reversal of the Korean market to the US market, is seen only
in Period 2. Roc in quintile 1, 2, and 5 is significantly different from zero
2Throughout the article, overnight return refers to the close-to-open return and in-
traday return to the open-to-close return, both on the futures of the regular market.
Overnight futures return refers to the return on the futures of the overnight market.
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with the opposite sign of Rus, and the correlation coefficient between them
is -0.206. This suggests that, during the growth period after the Asian eco-
nomic crisis, the Korean market became widely exposed to international
capital and vulnerable to global economic shocks, sometimes causing irra-
tional overreactions by investors. However, the extent of the overreaction
decreases considerably as the market matures, especially after opening of the
overnight futures market, because the overnight market absorbs the infor-
mation released during the night and provides sufficient time for a feedback
loop to stabilize any irrational price movement.
Overreaction does not seem to occur after calm-down periods. In all
samples, Roc is either insignificant or significant but the sign is counter-
intuitive. This could be because investors have enough time to evaluate
news from the US market fairly, or because the news is mixed with other
news released during the calm-down period.
[ TABLE 2 HERE ]
[ TABLE 3 HERE ]
4. Investment Strategies Based on Overreaction
As demonstrated in the previous section, the Korean market overreacts
to shocks from the US market at opening and this overreaction subsides dur-
ing the market opening hours. In this section, we propose a trading strategy
exploiting this market inefficiency and test if a profit can be generated.
4.1. Naive Risky Investment Strategies
We first employ a simple contrarian trading strategy, in which if the US
market drops during the night, we buy a KOSPI200 futures contract in the
pre-opening batch auction and sell it in the post-market batch auction, and
vice versa. We choose the auction so that we can ignore bid-ask spread. The
return of the strategy is calculated by the formula
R =
Fc(1− f)− Fo(1 + f)
Fo(M + f)
(long position)
R =
Fo(1− f)− Fc(1 + f)
Fo(M + f)
(short position)
(1)
where Fo and Fc respectively denote the opening and the closing price of
the futures contract. The brokerage fee, f , is assumed to be 0.3bp. The
margin ratio, M , is set to 15% of the trading volume except for the period
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of October 11, 2010 to October 7, 2011, in which it is set to 13.5%. Because
the reversal is more significant when the US market moves considerably, we
test three variations of the strategy. In Strategy 1, we invest considering
only the sign of the US market return regardless of its size. In Strategy
2, we invest only when the size of the return exceeds 0.2%, i.e., when the
return falls into quintiles 1, 2, 4, or 5. In Strategy 3, we invest only when
the return drops below -0.75% (quintile 1) or rises above 0.75% (quintile 5).
We assume no trading on the day after a calm-down period because reversal
is not significant on these days, as shown in the previous section.
The performance of each strategy is reported in Table 4. Due to the
high leverage of the futures contract, the return is extremely high, but also
extremely volatile. In all three cases, the final value is over one million times
the initial value. The returns are relatively low from 2005 onward, except
for 2008, when the global economy went into a recession triggered by the
sub-prime mortgage market crash in the United States. In this period, all
the global markets reacted extremely sensitively to news from the United
States and our contrarian investment strategies enjoy an extremely high
return. Since 2009, all three strategies perform poorly experiencing negative
returns in most years. This is also illustrated in Figure 1. We hypothesize
that this is because introduction of the overnight futures market mitigates
overreaction in the regular market.
Among the three strategies, the first strategy offers the most trading
opportunities, but the second strategy yields the highest value at the end
of the sample period, which means a higher return per trade. The third
strategy provides the least investment opportunities, less than half that of
the first strategy, but it still achieves a comparably high return and indeed
performs best in terms of the Sharpe ratio. The choice between Strategy 2
and 3 is not clear and we compare them under different circumstances later
in this section.
[ TABLE 4 HERE ]
[ FIGURE 1 HERE ]
Though the returns are apparently extremely high, these naive strategies
are too risky for real world implementation and unrealistic considering the
size of the market. We need a more realistic strategy that controls risk
within a tolerable level. Before we explore this topic further, we investigate
the source of return by running the following regression
R = β0 + β1|Rus|+ β2D1|Rus|+ β3D3|Rus|+ β4Dcd|Rus|+ e (2)
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where R is the return of the contrarian strategy as defined in Equation 1.
Dummy variables D1 and D3 respectively indicate the sample Period 1 and
3, and Dcd indicates the day after a calm-down period. The regression
results are reported in Table 5. Except for the dummy for Period 3, which
is significant at 5% level, all other variables are significant at 1% level. This
suggests that the strategy performs best in the second period, especially
when we trade only on normal days avoiding the days immediately after
calm-down periods. In fact, trading on the day after a calm-down period
is expected to yield a negative return. Though not reported here, we also
examine whether the sign or size of Rus affect R in a nonlinear fashion by
adding additional dummy variables for the sign and quintiles of Rus. These
variables, however, turn out to be insignificant factors.
[ TABLE 5 HERE ]
4.2. Investment Strategies with Risk Control
Investing entire wealth into the futures market is too risky and unre-
alistic. A viable strategy essentially needs to control risk within a certain
level. Therefore, we modify the naive strategies so that only a portion of
the total wealth is invested in the futures and the rest is invested in a risk
free asset. The wealth allocated to the futures is managed by the contrarian
investment strategy described earlier in this section. If the market condition
does not meet the investment criteria of the strategy under consideration,
the total wealth is invested in the risk free asset. For example, if the US
market return is within the range (-0.75% , 0.75%), no trade takes place in
the futures market under Strategy 3. Also, the wealth is entirely invested
in the risk free asset the day after a calm-down period.
We consider two allocation methods: the first method involves maximiz-
ing long run growth return as proposed by Kelly (1956), while the second
method imposes a risk limit defined as Value-at-Risk (VaR). Assuming that
the futures return3 is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2,
Kelly ratio can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem
max
w0,w1
E [ln (w0(1 +Rf ) + w1(1 +R))] (3)
subject to
w0 + w1 = 1
3More precisely, futures return here refers to the return on the futures managed via
the contrarian strategy.
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where Rf and R are returns on the risk free asset and the futures contract,
respectively, and w0 and w1 are the portfolio weights of the two assets. The
overnight call rate from the Bank of Korea is used as a proxy for the risk
free rate. As shown in Merton (1990), the solution has the closed form
w0 = 1− w1, w1 = µ−Rf
σ
(4)
Under the same normality assumption, VaR of the portfolio at probability
level α is given by the following equation
V aR = Zαw1σ − (w0Rf + w1µ) (5)
where Zα is the Z-value at α. If we set the VaR limit to L, the portfolio
weights are determined by the equation
w0 = 1− w1, w1 = L+Rf
Zασ +Rf − µ (6)
Three risk tolerance levels, 2.5%, 5%, and 10% at α = 0.01 are applied for
simulation.
Trading a large volume in the auction can impact the market, shifting
the price in an undesirable direction. Market impact could be minimized
by breaking the total volume into smaller volumes and trading them in the
regular market through stealth trading.4 This is supported by Fung et al.
(2010) and Park and Yi (2011), who note that correction of mispricing due
to overreaction does not take place immediately after the market opens but
progresses slowly and steadily throughout the market opening hours. Still,
as a conservative measure, we consider cases where the price is shifted by
1 or 2 ticks in every trade, and limit the maximum number of contracts to
1,000. The initial wealth is assumed to be 1 billion KRW, which is enough
for 50 to 100 futures contracts depending on the price.
To implement the above allocation methods, we need to estimate µ and
σ. According to Chopra and Ziemba (1993), estimation error of mean is
more critical to optimal portfolio choice than that of variance-covariance.
We employ the regression equation in (2) to estimate the mean and the
4For details of stealth trading, refer to Barclay and Warner (1993) or Kyle (1985), and
for stealth trading in the Korean futures market, refer to Ryu (2012).
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variance of the return of the contrarian strategy, i.e.,
µˆ = βˆ0 + βˆ1|Rus| (7)
σˆ2 = Variance(R− µˆ) (8)
We omit the calm-down dummy variable as we exclude the day after a
calm-down period both from the regression sample and from the trading
simulation sample. The period dummies are also unnecessary as we employ
a rolling regression method and update the parameters everyday using a
sample of 60 trading days prior to the estimation day. µ and σ are estimated
independently using a different sample for each strategy; for example, the
regression sample for Strategy 3 consists only of the days when Rus falls into
Q1 or Q5. This approach provides a better forecast of µ and σ because we
apply the same criteria for trading simulation.
4.3. Empirical Results
The estimated mean and variance of the contrarian strategy return are
reported in Table 6 and displayed in Figure 2. Only Strategy 2 and 3
are tested as they outperform Strategy 1. The first thing to note is the
continuous decrease in both mean and variance with time except for the
periods of global economic crisis in 2008 and 2011. It can be inferred that, as
the market grows, it becomes more efficient, and exploiting mispricing from
overreaction becomes more difficult. This also indicates that the overnight
futures market, though it certainly helps, is not the decisive factor to the
mitigated overreaction.
When Strategy 2 and 3 are compared, Strategy 3 has a slightly higher
mean and standard deviation: 0.63% higher (41.2% increase) in mean and
0.88% higher (9.6% increase) in sigma for the entire simulation period. This
is consistent with the higher Sharpe ratio reported in Table 4. It is expected
from Equation (4) and (6) that the increased µ/σ of Strategy 3 will lead to
a bigger w1 in the Kelly method and the decreased 1/(Zασ−µ) will lead to
a smaller w1 in the risk limit method.
[ TABLE 6 HERE ]
[ FIGURE 2 HERE ]
The trading simulation results are reported in Table 7, 8, and 9. Panel
(a) and (b) contain the investment results of one billion won in Period 2 and
3, respectively, while panel (c) shows the results of investing one billion won
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in both Period 2 and 3. Accumulation of wealth by each strategy is also
visualized in Figure 3 and 4.
We first compare the results across allocation methods, i.e., the Kelly
and the risk limit methods. As the results are qualitatively similar, we focus
on the results in Table 7, which are obtained under the assumption of no
market impact. Under Strategy 2, the average weight of the futures contract
ranges from 13.41% to 20.01% in Period 2, and from 7.23% to 67.56% in
Period 3, depending on the risk preference. The average weight is in a simi-
lar range under Strategy 3, with some variations among allocation methods.
Although a higher w1 is naturally associated with a higher risk tolerance,
the reverse is observed when the 5% and the 10% risk limit portfolios are
compared. This is because the 10% risk limit portfolio grows faster in Pe-
riod 1 and is often bounded by the order limit of 1,000 contracts. Since we
are investing in futures contracts, the actual exposure to the market is 6.67
times higher5 and even the most conservative portfolio with 2.5% risk limit
allocates 50.8% to the market portfolio in Period 2 and 57.7% in Period 3
under Strategy 3. The portfolio with 10% risk limit earns the highest overall
return in most cases but its value can decrease very quickly under adverse
market conditions. In contrast, although a more conservative portfolio nor-
mally possesses a lower return and volatility, its return can be higher than
that of riskier ones when the overreaction is weak, as in Period 3. The Kelly
portfolio is comparable to the 5% risk limit portfolio in several aspects. The
annual return is sometimes higher and sometimes lower depending on the
case. However, the Kelly portfolio has a consistently lower w1 and the differ-
ence increases when the market is unfavorable. This implies that the Kelly
method is more agile in timing than the risk limit method. Indeed, compar-
ison of Equation (4) and (6) shows that the Kelly method is more sensitive
to µ and σ. Though not reported here, we also test a combined model of
Kelly method and the risk limit method, in which VaR of the Kelly portfolio
is constrained by a limit. That is, if VaR of the Kelly portfolio exceeds a
limit, it is rebalanced so that VaR stays within the limit. In contrast to our
expectations, this approach does not improve the performance of the Kelly
method and the overall return is lower for all periods.
Next, we compare Strategy 2 and 3. As noted earlier, Strategy 3 has
a higher overall µ and σ than Strategy 2. This results in a roughly 5%
higher w1 of the Kelly portfolio under Strategy 3, compensating for the
reduced number of trading opportunities. Ignoring the effect of order limit,
5The margin rate of 15% corresponds to leverage of 6.67.
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w1 of the risk limit portfolios, as expected, are decreased under Strategy
3. With higher allocation in the risky investment, the Kelly portfolio under
Strategy 3 achieves a fairly high return even with the limited number of
trading days. Strategy 3, despite its lower overall return, also has a much
higher Sharpe ratio compared to Strategy 2, about 3.0 versus 2.2 for the
entire period. More importantly, all allocation methods under Strategy 3
maintain a positive return even in Period 3 and the values are significantly
higher than those under Strategy 2. The advantage of Strategy 3 is more
noticeable when market impact is considered: under the assumption of 2
tick price shift, the annual return is as high as that of Strategy 2 in Period
2 and higher in Period 3, resulting in a higher overall return. In sum, it can
be said that Strategy 3 is more robust to changes in market conditions.
With weakened overreaction after the opening of the overnight futures
market, most strategies suffer from a low or even negative return in Period
3, and especially when market impact is assumed, none of the strategies we
evaluate seems to survive. This may lead to the conclusion that a strategy
based on overreaction is not viable in a mature market. However, closer
observation of the results exposes an important fact: spikes in the wealth
curve around late 2008 and late 2011 are clearly visible in Figure 3 and 4.
These two periods correspond to the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and Eu-
rope debt crisis, respectively, during which the global market was unstable.
This implies that even though there are fewer investment opportunities in a
mature market, opportunities still exist during a global crisis.
Finally, when a price shift due to market impact is assumed, the expected
return on the futures becomes smaller and so does the weight. This is
followed by a lower return on the portfolio. Still, the lowest annual return
of Strategy 2 and 3, which mostly comes from the 2.5% risk limit portfolio,
is respectively 17.4% and 16.4% under 1 tick shift and 5.6% and 10.3%
under 2 tick shift for the entire period. We consider this result to be very
encouraging considering the conservativeness of our assumptions.
[ TABLE 7 HERE ]
[ TABLE 8 HERE ]
[ TABLE 9 HERE ]
[ FIGURE 3 HERE ]
[ FIGURE 4 HERE ]
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5. Concluding Remarks
In this article, we investigate overreaction of emerging markets to infor-
mation from the US market, with a focus on the Korean market. Our study
distinguishes itself from previous studies in two aspects. We address the re-
lationship between the degree of overreaction and the development status of
the market by dividing market status into three periods: opening, growth,
and maturation of the market. We also design investment strategies that
exploit the overreaction and test if they can generate a significant profit
under realistic assumptions.
In the opening period of the Korean capital market, it is only partially
integrated with the global market and the impact of the shocks from the US
market is restrictive. There is even a hint of underreaction in this period.
Once the market gains momentum and enters the growth period, it is widely
exposed to international capital and becomes very sensitive to outside in-
formation. Overreaction by irrational investors is commonly observed in
this period. As the market matures, overreaction mostly disappears except
for periods of global economic crisis. The overnight futures market, which
functions as a cushion to absorb the shocks from the US market over the
night, effectively mitigates overreaction in the regular market.
A contrarian investment strategy that exploits the overreaction phe-
nomenon performs remarkably well during the growth period, but it is not
viable after the overnight futures market opens and the regular market be-
comes more efficient. Nevertheless, investment opportunities can still be
sought out during an economic crisis in which the global market becomes
unstable. Investment strategies can be improved by carefully choosing trade
opportunities; trading only when the US market moves beyond a certain level
offers a higher return per trade and a higher Sharpe ratio. Furthermore,
more reliable performance can be achieved when the strategy is accompa-
nied by appropriate control of risk. All the strategies we test maintain a
positive return under the most conservative market assumptions. The 10%
risk limit portfolio performs best during the growth period, but a portfolio
with a more conservative risk limit performs better in the mature market
with no apparent overreaction.
Our research focuses on the Korean market and thus our findings may
not be generalizable to other countries. Applying our methodology to other
countries and comparing the results would be a good comparative analysis
study to perform. We find that the overnight futures market does affect the
regular market. In-depth investigation of the interactions between these two
markets must be a fruitful topic for future research.
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Table 1: The growth of the KOSPI200 index and its futures markets. This table reports the
growth of the KOSPI200 index and its spot and futures markets during the sample period.
The columns under KOSPI200 represent the index value and the volume of the spot
market, and the columns under Regular Mkt and Overnight Mkt respectively represent
the volumes of the regular futures market and the overnight futures market. Cnt denotes
the average daily number of contracts in thousands and Vol denotes the average daily
trading volume in billion US dollars. Trading volume is converted from Korean won to
US dollar using the exchange rate at the end of each day.
Year Trading KOSPI200 Regular Mkt Overnight Mkt
days Index Vol Cnt Vol Cnt Vol
1996.05
1996 195 67.93 0.23 3.55 0.19
1997 292 42.34 0.26 10.73 0.37
1998 292 64.97 0.32 60.21 1.01
1999 249 130.02 2.10 68.23 2.74
2000 241 63.35 1.78 80.90 3.13
2001 246 86.97 1.12 126.72 3.52
2002 244 79.87 1.67 172.96 6.47
2003 247 105.21 1.41 247.69 8.95
2004 249 115.25 1.49 218.77 10.23
2005 249 177.43 2.22 171.18 11.59
2006 247 185.39 2.76 182.58 16.69
2007 246 241.27 4.51 188.70 22.45
2008 248 146.35 3.92 261.03 22.36
2009 253 221.86 3.72 321.63 23.44 0.70 0.06
2010 251 271.19 3.97 336.29 33.36 3.78 0.38
2011 248 238.08 5.23 329.70 38.59 15.56 1.73
2012.09 187 262.49 3.41 230.75 25.76 29.16 3.24
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Table 2: Overreaction of the Korean market to the US market. This table analyzes the
Korean market reaction to information from the US market. N is the number of trading
days, Rus is the daily return on the S&P500, Rco and Roc are the close-to-open and the
open-to-close returns on the KOSPI200 futures traded in the regular market, respectively,
and Rov is the return on the futures traded in the overnight market. The S&P500 return
is split into quintiles with thresholds of -0.75%, -0.20%, 0.20%, and 0.75% and averaged in
each quintile. Period 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the opening, growth, and maturation of the
Korean market, respectively. The exact dates of each period are described in Section 3.
Calm Down denotes the days after a calm-down period and Normal Days denotes the rest
of the trading days. * and ** respectively denote 5% and 1% level of significance.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total
N 824 660 748 843 865 3940
All Rus -1.67** -0.45** 0.00 0.45** 1.63** 0.03
Days Rco -1.14** -0.16** 0.01 0.24** 1.07** 0.02
Roc 0.10 0.14** 0.02 0.00 -0.11* 0.03
N 676 541 621 688 736 3262
Normal Rus -1.68** -0.45** 0.00 0.45** 1.63** 0.04*
Days Rco -1.14** -0.17** -0.02 0.20** 1.05** 0.01
Roc 0.20** 0.20** 0.00 0.03 -0.18** 0.04
N 148 119 127 155 129 678
Calm Rus -1.60** -0.45** 0.01 0.44** 1.60** -0.02
Down Rco -1.13** -0.12 0.17** 0.40** 1.18** 0.08
Roc -0.35** -0.09 0.09 -0.13 0.31* -0.05
(a) Whole Period
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total
N 219 213 163 233 264 1092
All Rus -1.53** -0.45** -0.02* 0.46** 1.50** 0.06*
Days Rco -1.19** -0.08 -0.12 0.04 0.92** -0.04
Roc -0.21 0.19 -0.11 0.15 0.14 0.05
N 199 194 150 217 236 996
Normal Rus -1.49** -0.46** -0.02 0.46** 1.48** 0.06*
Days Rco -1.12** -0.10 -0.17 -0.01 0.83** -0.07
Roc -0.08 0.26 -0.21 0.24 0.07 0.07
N 20 19 13 16 28 96
Calm Rus -1.91** -0.42** -0.02 0.52** 1.63** 0.08
Down Rco -1.90** 0.12 0.46 0.64 1.70** 0.29
Roc -1.53** -0.43 1.04 -1.04 0.68 -0.24
(b) Period 1
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total
N 479 338 431 447 457 2152
All Rus -1.74** -0.45** 0.01 0.45** 1.72** 0.00
Days Rco -1.14** -0.21** 0.05 0.34** 1.20** 0.05
Roc 0.26** 0.17* 0.07 -0.06 -0.28** 0.03
N 377 260 338 358 377 1710
Regular Rus -1.79** -0.45** 0.01 0.45** 1.74** 0.02
Days Rco -1.17** -0.21** 0.01 0.32** 1.22** 0.05
Roc 0.38** 0.23** 0.08 -0.10 -0.38** 0.03
N 102 78 93 89 80 442
Calm Rus -1.54** -0.45** 0.01 0.43** 1.61** -0.06
Down Rco -1.03** -0.20* 0.19** 0.43** 1.06** 0.04
Roc -0.17 -0.04 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.01
(c) Period 2
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total
N 126 109 154 163 144 696
All Rus -1.64** -0.44** 0.00 0.45** 1.57** 0.06
Days Rco -1.03** -0.18** 0.04 0.24** 0.96** 0.05
Roc 0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01
Rov -0.88** -0.10 0.04 0.18** 0.77** 0.03
N 100 87 133 113 123 556
Normal Rus -1.66** -0.43** -0.01 0.45** 1.58** 0.07
Days Rco -1.06** -0.21** 0.06 0.23** 0.97** 0.05
Roc 0.09 -0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.01
Rov -0.87** -0.07 0.05* 0.16** 0.77** 0.05
N 26 22 21 50 21 140
Calm Rus -1.56** -0.47** 0.03 0.44** 1.54** 0.03
Down Rco -0.93** -0.05 -0.08 0.26** 0.95** 0.04
Roc -0.16 0.00 -0.13 -0.22 0.26 -0.09
Rov -0.92** -0.24** -0.07 0.24** 0.78** -0.02
(d) Period 3
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Table 3: Correlation between the US market and the Korean market. This table reports
the correlation coefficients between the S&P500 return and KOSPI200 futures returns for
each period. Rus is the daily return on the S&P500, Rco and Roc are the close-to-open and
the open-to-close returns on the KOSPI200 futures traded in the regular market, and Rov
is the return on the futures traded in the overnight market. Period 1, 2, and 3 correspond
to the opening, growth, and maturation of the Korean market, respectively. The exact
dates of each period are described in Section 3. * and ** respectively denote 5% and 1%
level of significance.
Rco Roc Rov
Whole Period Rus 0.557** -0.112**
Period 1 Rus 0.348** -0.023
Period 2 Rus 0.760** -0.206**
Period 3 Rus 0.787** -0.045 0.708**
20
Table 4: Performance analysis of naive risky investment strategies. This table reports
the annual return and the year end value of the three portfolios investing purely in the
KOSPI200 futures with an initial value of 1. The investment strategies are described in
detail in Section 4. Avg(R − Rf ) and Std(R − Rf ) are the average and the standard
deviation of the annualized daily excess return, respectively, and the Sharpe Ratio is the
ratio of these two values. Avg(R−Rf ) and Std(R−Rf ) are in percentages while Annual
Return is not.
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Annual EOY Annual EOY Annual EOY
Return Value Return Value Return Value
2000.12
2000 1.96 2.96 1.96 2.96 1.21 2.21
2001 21.02 65.27 19.14 59.70 24.36 56.03
2002 24.92 1.69e3 9.35 6.18e2 32.49 1.88e3
2003 8.05 1.53e4 15.56 1.02e4 8.45 1.77e4
2004 15.16 2.48e5 13.18 1.45e5 1.78 4.93e4
2005 5.53 1.62e6 3.94 7.17e5 0.83 9.00e4
2006 0.31 2.13e6 2.36 1.70e6 0.01 9.09e4
2007 0.20 2.55e6 1.43 4.11e6 0.84 1.67e5
2008 48.70 1.27e8 29.93 1.27e8 18.36 3.24e6
2009 -0.60 5.12e7 -0.53 5.96e7 -0.33 2.17e6
2010 -0.18 4.21e7 -0.13 5.18e7 -0.07 2.02e6
2011 -0.49 2.13e7 0.08 5.58e7 0.57 3.18e6
2012.09 -0.56 9.27e6 -0.36 3.55e7 -0.02 3.11e6
Trading Days 2266 1795 977
Avg(R−Rf ) 277.50 352.50 507.50
Std(R−Rf ) 145.62 152.11 164.44
Sharpe Ratio 1.91 2.32 3.09
Table 5: Regression analysis of the contrarian strategy return. This table reports the
regression results of the contrarian strategy return on the S&P500 return. The contrarian
strategy is described in Section 4. The regression equation has the form
R = β0 + β1|Rus|+ β2D1|Rus|+ β3D3|Rus|+ β4Dcd|Rus|+ e
where dummy variables D1 and D3 respectively indicate the sample period 1 and 3, and
Dcd indicates the day after a calm-down period. The values in parentheses are p-values.
Intercept |Rus| D1|Rus| D3|Rus| Dcd|Rus| R2 adj.R2 F value
0.017 1.349 -1.235 -0.961 -1.780 0.013 0.012 12.91
(0.948) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 6: Mean-variance estimation of the contrarian strategies. The mean and variance
are estimated from the equations
µˆ = βˆ0 + βˆ1|Rus|, σˆ2 = Variance(R− µˆ)
Parameters are updated everyday using a sample of 60 trading days prior to the estimation
day. Column µˆ and σˆ are average daily values expressed in percentages. Days refers to
the number of trading days in each period.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
µˆ σˆ Days µˆ σˆ Days
2000.09
2000 5.05 15.78 12 3.17 16.35 9
2001 3.97 12.07 160 4.92 12.97 97
2002 2.27 12.31 164 4.01 11.30 115
2003 2.14 9.54 159 3.15 10.56 90
2004 2.28 8.52 137 2.33 7.53 57
2005 1.67 7.32 147 1.89 7.13 52
2006 0.83 7.46 132 0.72 7.70 39
2007 0.54 7.20 134 0.41 7.88 66
2008 2.91 10.73 172 3.32 11.63 123
2009 0.10 11.46 172 -0.09 13.22 114
2010 -0.08 5.72 146 0.69 6.10 72
2011 0.80 8.38 158 1.12 8.35 102
2012.09 -0.26 6.14 102 0.42 7.53 41
Period 2 1.95 9.88 1372 2.56 10.82 754
Period 3 0.18 6.84 423 0.84 7.43 223
Period 2-3 1.53 9.16 1795 2.17 10.04 977
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Table 7: Investment performance under risk control: 0 tick shift. This table compares
investment results of different allocation methods described in Section 4, under no market
impact assumption. Kelly denotes a portfolio managed by the Kelly method, and 2.5%,
5.0%, and 10% refer to portfolios with 99% VaR limit of these values. The initial wealth
is assumed to be 1 billion wons and EOP value is the end of period value. Order limit
is the number of days that hit the order limit (1000 contracts). w1 is the average weight
on the futures contract. Avg(R−Rf ) and Std(R−Rf ) are the average and the standard
deviation of the annualized daily excess return, respectively, and the Sharpe Ratio is the
ratio of these two values. Annual return, w1, Avg(R − Rf ), and Std(R − Rf ) are in
percentages.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 161.68 22.44 161.52 212.57 93.24 9.60 63.36 137.94
Annual return 76.51 41.56 76.49 81.99 65.98 28.75 58.97 73.41
Trading days 1372 1372 1372 1372 754 754 754 754
Order limit 512 0 693 1082 259 0 17 585
w1 15.53 13.41 20.01 18.59 20.26 12.33 24.40 23.05
Avg(R−Rf ) 95.36 54.24 93.37 101.72 152.39 69.03 137.49 166.13
Std(R−Rf ) 38.01 19.61 31.61 40.86 44.66 19.99 39.17 45.74
Sharpe ratio 2.51 2.77 2.95 2.49 3.41 3.45 3.51 3.63
(a) Period 2
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 0.69 1.02 0.94 0.70 1.02 1.23 1.39 1.59
Annual return -11.99 0.78 -2.27 -11.60 0.84 7.50 12.10 17.49
Trading days 423 423 423 423 223 223 223 223
Order limit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
w1 7.23 16.97 33.89 67.56 12.76 16.42 32.78 65.45
Avg(R−Rf ) -21.33 -0.21 -0.45 2.20 3.03 18.99 37.83 73.99
Std(R−Rf ) 26.10 18.27 36.47 72.50 35.34 19.10 38.13 75.94
Sharpe ratio -0.82 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.99 0.99 0.97
(b) Period 3
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 155.11 22.95 174.08 227.96 104.23 11.81 84.01 162.68
Annual return 53.24 30.36 54.75 58.32 48.17 23.24 45.49 53.86
Trading days 1795 1795 1795 1795 977 977 977 977
Order limit 611 0 1116 1505 314 0 216 808
w1 12.83 14.25 17.78 16.10 17.75 13.26 24.16 20.44
Avg(R−Rf ) 71.63 41.41 71.81 78.05 119.32 57.61 112.70 131.24
Std(R−Rf ) 33.56 19.35 28.27 36.06 40.04 19.83 36.66 40.84
Sharpe ratio 2.13 2.14 2.54 2.16 2.98 2.91 3.07 3.21
(c) Period 2 and 3
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Table 8: Investment performance under risk control: 1 tick shift. This table compares
investment results of different allocation methods described in Section 4, under 1 tick
price shift assumption. Kelly denotes a portfolio managed by the Kelly method, and
2.5%, 5.0%, and 10% refer to portfolios with 99% VaR limit of these values. The initial
wealth is assumed to be 1 billion wons and EOP value is the end of period value. Order
limit is the number of days that hit the order limit (1000 contracts). w1 is the average
weight on the futures contract. Avg(R − Rf ) and Std(R − Rf ) are the average and the
standard deviation of the annualized daily excess return, respectively, and the Sharpe
Ratio is the ratio of these two values. Annual return, w1, Avg(R−Rf ), and Std(R−Rf )
are in percentages.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 34.93 7.97 40.75 132.56 22.92 5.45 20.80 93.46
Annual return 48.74 26.09 51.32 72.64 41.90 20.85 40.37 66.02
Trading days 1372 1372 1372 1372 754 754 754 754
Order limit 10 0 7 949 9 0 0 521
w1 15.90 13.01 25.95 27.45 19.44 11.97 23.89 30.56
Avg(R−Rf ) 67.76 35.22 70.38 96.60 106.30 50.07 100.20 157.14
Std(R−Rf ) 39.05 18.99 37.87 48.67 46.22 19.37 38.66 53.73
Sharpe ratio 1.74 1.85 1.86 1.98 2.30 2.59 2.59 2.92
(a) Period 2
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 0.68 0.84 0.63 0.32 0.95 1.11 1.13 1.05
Annual return -12.81 -5.95 -14.71 -32.70 -1.87 3.59 4.23 1.88
Trading days 423 423 423 423 223 223 223 223
Order limit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
w1 5.36 16.63 33.21 66.24 9.78 16.09 32.13 64.17
Avg(R−Rf ) -23.36 -11.98 -23.76 -44.86 -6.68 7.01 14.12 27.09
Std(R−Rf ) 24.24 17.90 35.75 71.11 32.46 18.69 37.33 74.45
Sharpe ratio -0.96 -0.67 -0.66 -0.63 -0.21 0.38 0.38 0.36
(b) Period 3
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 26.49 6.68 26.84 121.72 22.48 6.03 23.42 104.24
Annual return 31.96 17.44 32.10 50.13 30.14 16.42 30.59 48.17
Trading days 1795 1795 1795 1795 977 977 977 977
Order limit 14 0 14 1372 13 0 0 744
w1 13.33 13.86 27.63 24.26 17.18 12.91 25.77 27.58
Avg(R−Rf ) 47.59 24.10 48.71 72.16 81.05 40.24 80.55 123.10
Std(R−Rf ) 35.36 18.78 37.39 43.25 42.80 19.24 38.41 48.25
Sharpe ratio 1.35 1.28 1.30 1.67 1.89 2.09 2.10 2.55
(c) Period 2 and 3
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Table 9: Investment performance under risk control: 2 tick shift. This table compares
investment results of different allocation methods described in Section 4, under 2 tick
price shift assumption. Kelly denotes a portfolio managed by the Kelly method, and
2.5%, 5.0%, and 10% refer to portfolios with 99% VaR limit of these values. The initial
wealth is assumed to be 1 billion wons and EOP value is the end of period value. Order
limit is the number of days that hit the order limit (1000 contracts). w1 is the average
weight on the futures contract. Avg(R − Rf ) and Std(R − Rf ) are the average and the
standard deviation of the annualized daily excess return, respectively, and the Sharpe
Ratio is the ratio of these two values. Annual return, w1, Avg(R−Rf ), and Std(R−Rf )
are in percentages.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 6.50 3.03 5.88 12.56 5.93 3.19 7.23 27.33
Annual return 23.26 13.17 21.89 32.67 22.01 13.86 24.74 44.72
Trading days 1372 1372 1372 1372 754 754 754 754
Order limit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
w1 11.47 12.63 25.21 50.31 14.64 11.63 23.21 46.05
Avg(R−Rf ) 35.02 17.45 34.65 68.79 58.82 32.25 64.64 129.21
Std(R−Rf ) 33.20 18.41 36.76 73.41 40.14 18.80 37.53 74.01
Sharpe ratio 1.05 0.95 0.94 0.94 1.47 1.72 1.72 1.75
(a) Period 2
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 0.68 0.70 0.44 0.15 0.90 1.00 0.92 0.71
Annual return -12.63 -11.71 -25.17 -48.21 -3.45 -0.02 -2.84 -11.21
Trading days 423 423 423 423 223 223 223 223
Order limit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
w1 4.08 16.30 32.56 64.97 7.22 15.78 31.50 62.93
Avg(R−Rf ) -23.40 -22.76 -46.13 -89.97 -12.73 -4.46 -8.71 -18.02
Std(R−Rf ) 22.59 17.54 35.05 69.78 29.84 18.36 36.60 73.03
Sharpe ratio -1.04 -1.30 -1.32 -1.29 -0.43 -0.24 -0.24 -0.25
(b) Period 3
Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% Kelly 2.5% 5.0% 10.0%
EOP value 4.41 2.12 2.56 1.90 5.36 3.19 6.66 22.92
Annual return 13.39 6.55 8.29 5.60 15.27 10.32 17.40 30.35
Trading days 1795 1795 1795 1795 977 977 977 977
Order limit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 113
w1 9.73 13.49 26.94 53.76 12.95 12.58 25.10 49.04
Avg(R−Rf ) 21.26 7.98 15.61 31.38 42.49 23.87 47.90 98.73
Std(R−Rf ) 31.06 18.24 36.42 72.67 38.07 18.71 37.35 72.40
Sharpe ratio 0.68 0.44 0.43 0.43 1.12 1.28 1.28 1.36
(c) Period 2 and 3
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Figure 1: Accumulation of wealth by naive risky investments.
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(a) Mean
(b) Variance
Figure 2: Estimated mean and variance of the contrarian strategies.
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(a) Strategy 2
(b) Strategy 3
Figure 3: Accumulation of wealth under risk control: 0 tick shift.
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(a) Strategy 2
(b) Strategy 3
Figure 4: Accumulation of wealth under risk control: 2 tick shift.
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